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I. INTRODUCTION
"Both the language and the legislative history of section 201(c)
suggest that when in doubt, courts should construe the rights of publishers
narrowly rather than broadly in relation to those of authors.... [O]ne must
bear in mind that Congress passed the section to enlarge the rights of
authors."'
At the dawn of a new millennium, the United States is in the midst of
unprecedented technological change in which our capacity to produce,
transmit, and receive information increases daily.2 The electronic media 3-
including compact disc read-only-memory devices (CD-ROMs) and online
services such as those provided by LEXIS/NEXIS (NEXIS) and
Westlaw-have redefined the ways in which consumers acquire this
information. As communicative technology grows, conflicts over
ownership of creative content are inevitable, giving rise to the need to
reevaluate the rules of ownership of intellectual property in the modem
environment of electronic publishing.
For more than a decade, publishers have increasingly made the
contents of their newspapers and magazines available through electronic
media. However, only recently have freelance 4 authors legally challenged
1. Ryan v. Carl Corp., 23 F. Supp.2d 1146, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
2. See MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 1.1, at 1 (3d ed.
1999).
3. See Sidney A. Rosenzweig, Comment, Don't Put My Article Online!: Extending
Copyright's New-use Doctrine to the Electronic Publishing Media and Beyond, 143 U. PA.
L. REV. 899, 899 n.3 (1995) (defining "electronic media" as "the new generation of media
that provide alternative avenues of distribution for the content available in traditional
publishing."). For the purposes of this Note, this definition does not include broadcast or
cable television or radio services; it does include electronic databases, such as
LEXIS/NEXIS and Westlaw, as well as CD-ROMs.
4. The term "freelance" in this Note refers to oral or written agreements solely
authorizing publishers to include an author's article in a newspaper or magazine. Under such
a "freelance" agreement, no rights other than those provided by statutory law are deemed
transferred. See Deirdre Carmody, Writers Fight for Electronic Rights, N.Y. Tnms, Nov. 7,
1994, at B20 (noting that, traditionally, written contracts have given publications "first
North American serial rights," meaning that they possessed exclusive domestic rights to
publish while writers retained all other publication rights. In contrast, "staff' writers create
works for hire in which all copyright ownership vests in the employer publisher.); 17 U.S.C.
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these publishers for allegedly infringing their copyrights in underlying
works of authorship.5 In the absence of express agreements to the contrary,
the authors maintain that section 201(c) of the Copyright Act of 1976 (1976
Act)6 gives publishers only the limited privilege of publishing an article as
part of a "particular collective work, any revision of that collective work,
and any later collective work in the same series ' 7 and that republication in
electronic media does not fit within this definition. Publishers disagree and
seek a more liberal interpretation of section 201(c). At its core, the issue
appears quite simple: What is the definition of "revision," and does it
include certain formats of electronic database publishing? Closely related
to this issue is another important question: Do certain electronic formats,
whether revisions or not, infringe an author's right of reproduction through
providing for and encouraging reprinting of individually copyrighted
articles?
This Note examines the existing bases for interpreting the section
201(c) revision privilege with respect to electronic media, including the
Act's plain language, legislative intent, and broader issues of public policy
in the realm of copyright. Part II discusses the body of copyright law
pertinent to this inquiry, beginning with a succinct and general overview.
Part III turns to the landmark case, Tasini v. New York Times,8 which is the
first and only case to interpret section 201(c) with respect to electronic
media. In addition, Part III examines the reasoning of both the district
court, which held in favor of the publisher defendants, and the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, which recently reversed the decision. Part IV
briefly analyzes a district court opinion out of the Second Circuit, Ryan v.
Carl Corp.,9 which is the only other case addressing section 201(c) and the
electronic media, albeit in dicta. Part V explores related case law dealing
with "new media" in licensing agreements, which offers further insight into
the role of public policy in new technology licensing cases. Part VI
examines copyright clearinghouses as necessary and effective tools for the
administration of collective licensing of freelance articles. Part VII
concludes that unauthorized republication of freelance articles in some new
media formats, including NEXIS and certain CD-ROMs, infringes on an
§ 201(b) (1994); see also Douglas Steinberg, Journalists' Rights to Their Own Work, 8 ART
& L. 113, 114 (1983).
5. See Rosalind Resnick, Writers, Data Bases Do Battle, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 7, 1994, at
28 ("Attorneys for both writers and publishers agree that Tasini-a case of first
impression-will have wide-ranging consequences for the publishing world ...
6. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c).
7. Id.
8. 972 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), rev'd, 192 F.3d 356 (2d Cir. 1999).
9. 23 F. Supp.2d 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
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author's reproduction rights. Such republication is authorized under section
201(c) only if it retains the publisher's contribution to the collective work,
is inherently recognizable as a version of that collective work, and does not
sever the individual article from the collective work. This Note ultimately
suggests a revision analysis which would effectively support the policy
goals of copyright incentive of both the 1976 Act and the U.S. Constitution.
Initially, one must ask why this inquiry is necessary in light of the
rapid movement toward unambiguous publishing contracts defining rights
of future publication, electronic or otherwise.'0 The answer is twofold.
First, electronic rights for a vast body of freelance articles written in the
past are at stake and the courts will ultimately decide whether writers or
publishers will receive the windfall represented by new technologies. For
example, a freelance article appearing in a 1965 edition of Time Magazine
can now be retrieved online through NEXIS, an arrangement profiting both
Time Magazine and Mead Data Central (Mead)--owners of NEXIS-but
not the author. If publishers win the legal battle, their industry will reap a
windfall from electronic republication rights. Second, the courts'
interpretations of section 201(c) establish a foundation upon which
bargaining will take place well into the future. The contractual bargaining
favored by the 1976 Act began in earnest following the Tasini v. New
York Times (Tasini )12 decision in 1997. If the courts continue to hold, as
did the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Tasini v. New York Times
(Tasini I])," that Congress intended certain electronic publishing rights to
attach to primary copyright holders, authors' rights will be strengthened.
But given that publishers wield more bargaining power than do most
freelance writers, the effect of such decisions may prove primarily a moral,
rather than economic, victory for authors' future rights.
II. PLACING THE ISSUE IN CONTEXT
A. The Historical Foundation of Copyright Law
The U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to pass copyright and
patent legislation "to promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and the useful
[a]rts, by securing for limited [t]imes, to [a]uthors and [i]nventors, the
10. See Carmody, supra note 4, at B20.
11. See Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 930 n.146 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 132
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5748) ("Nothing in the bill derogates from
the rights of parties to contract with each other and to sue for breaches of contract.").
12. 972 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), rev'd, 192 F.3d 356 (2d Cir. 1999).
13. 192 F.3d 356 (2d Cir. 1999).
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exclusive [flight to their respective [w]ritings and [d]iscoveries. ' ' 4 The
Constitutional Convention adopted this clause in 1787 without debate and,
consequently, there is little documentary evidence of the Framers' intent
with regard to its language and scope. 5 Scholars often refer to the
following comment by James Madison in The Federalist when seeking to
shed light on this issue:
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The
copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to
be a right of common law. The right to useful inventions seems with
equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public good fully
coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals.
16
Based on the constitutional language and consistent with Madison's
commentary, the Copyright Clause clearly promotes the dissemination of
knowledge to enhance the public welfare through an economic incentive of
limited monopoly given to the author.1 7 Indeed, much later, in the 1954
Mazer v. Stein 1 opinion, the Supreme Court explained the rationale
underlying the Copyright Clause as follows: "The economic philosophy
behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is
the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is
the best way to advance the public welfare through the talents of authors
and inventors in '[s]cience and the [u]seful [a]rts.....9
On this pretense, the first federal Copyright Act of 1790 (1790 Act)
provided protection to the author or his assignees of any map, chart, or
book for fourteen years with a renewal period of equal length.2' General
revisions took place in 1831 and 1870, but it was not until 1909 that
Congress overhauled the 1790 Act to meet the challenges of the modem
era. The Copyright Act of 1909 (1909 Act), the result of several years of
extensive labor and the input of a multitude of governmental and private
interests, ultimately lacked clarity and coherence, making it difficult to
administer.2 ' Nevertheless, Congress achieved several notable
improvements: expanding copyrightable subject matter to include "all the
writings of an author," splitting duration into an initial twenty-eight year
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
15. See WILLIAM F. PATRY, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 5 (6th ed. 1986).
16. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison)).
17. See LEAFFER, supra note 2, § 1.3, at6.
18. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
19. Id. at 219.
20. See PATRY, supra note 15, at 6.
21. See id. at 10.
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term with a second twenty-eight year renewal, 22 and changing the trigger
for federal copyright to publication rather than registration.
B. Current Law Under the Copyright Act of 1976
Many decades of technological, social, and economic changes forced
Congress to amend the 1909 Act in a piecemeal fashion. But in 1955,
Congress authorized comprehensive hearings and reports that culminated-
nearly twenty years later-in the 1976 Act.23 Among other extensive
changes, the 1976 Act: (1) provides protection to all works "fixed in a
tangible medium of expression" without requiring the work to be
published;2 (2) extends the duration of protection to the life of the author
plus seventy years;2 (3) allows for copyright divisibility through licensing
or assignment of a copyright "in whole or in part; ''26 and (4) guarantees the
five exclusive rights embodied in section 106: rights of reproduction,
adaptation, public distribution, performance, and display.27
Section 102(a) of the 1976 Act outlines an "illustrative" list of eight
categories of copyrightable subject matter which Congress intended to be
liberally interpreted:2 literary works; musical works; dramatic works;
pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial, graphic and sculptural
works; motion pictures and other audiovisual works; sound recordings; and
architectural works.29
Section 102(a) also enunciates the threshold copyright requirements
of fixation and originality when it states: "Copyright protection subsists...
in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression
22. LEAFFER, supra note 2, § 1.4, at 7-8.
23. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 47-50 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5660-63.
24. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1994).
25. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 302(a) (Supp. IV 1998). By amendment in 1998, Congress
extended the term from the original "life of the author plus 50 years."
26. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (1994).
27. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West 1999); see also LEAFFER, supra note 2, § 1.5, at 10;
DONALD S. CHIsUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
§ 4A, at 4-7 (1992).
28. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5664.
Authors are continually finding new ways of expressing themselves, but it is
impossible to foresee the forms that these new expressive methods will take. The
bill does not intend either to freeze the scope of copyrightable subject matter at the
present stage of communications technology or to allow unlimited expansion into
areas completely outside the present congressional intent.
Id.
29. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
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.... ,30 Fixation is clearly defined in the 1976 Act as an "embodiment in a
copy or phonorecord" by the author and "sufficiently permanent to permit
it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of
more than a transitory duration." 31 Originality, on the other hand, is not
defined by the Act, but case law has construed it to require both
"independent creation" and "a modest quantum of creativity. ''32 In the
majority opinion of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service
Co.,33 Justice O'Connor wrote that originality simply required that a work
not be copied and that the "requisite level of creativity is extremely low;
even a slight amount will suffice."'34
Turning to the focus of this Note, section 103 also provides copyright
protection to two categories of works not listed in section 102(a):
compilations and derivative works. 5 Congress limits protection in these
categories "to the material contributed by the author of such work, as
distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work."
36
"Compilation" is specifically defined under section 101 as "a work formed
by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are
selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a
whole constitutes an original work of authorship." 37 Feist interpreted both
the 1976 Act and the Constitution's Copyright Clause to require a
minimum level of originality in the case of a compilation just as with
primary works.33 Specifically, the Court held that alphabetical listings of
names with telephone numbers in the white pages of a telephone book were
uncopyrightable facts and that the telephone company had not "selected,
coordinated[,] or arranged" these facts in a sufficiently original way to
satisfy the minimum standards for copyright protection. 39 Feist explicitly
rejected the "'sweat of the brow approach previously used by many courts
to protect a plaintiff's expenditure of time, money[,] and energy regardless
30. Id.
31. Id. § 101 (1994).
32. CRAIG JOYCE ETAL., COPYRIGHT LAW § 2.02, at 81 (4th ed. 1998).
33. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
34. Id. at 345.
35. "A 'derivative' work is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization... or any other form in which a work may
be recast, transformed, or adapted." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994); see generally 1 MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NMMER, NmMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.02, at 3-5 (1998).
36. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1994).
37. Id. § 101 (1994).
38. See Feist Publications., Inc., 499 U.S. at 345; see also Baker v. Seldon, 101 U.S. 99
(1879).
39. See Feist Publications., Inc., 499 U.S. at 362.
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of whether original material was added to a work."4 Justice O'Connor
clarified that "the 1976 revisions to the Copyright Act leave no doubt that
originality, not 'sweat of the brow,' is the touchstone of copyright
protection in directories and other fact-based works.... [A] compilation is
copyrightable only to the extent that it features an original selection,
coordination, or arrangement. 41
The 1976 Act further elaborates that compilations consisting of
individual contributions themselves capable of copyright are called
collective works. Section 101 defines a "collective work" as "a work, such
as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of
contributions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves,
are assembled into a collective whole.,
42
While examples of collective works would include the above
examples, they would not include a composition consisting of words and
music, a book published with illustrations, or three one-act plays, where
relatively few separate elements have been combined in the collection.4 As
in the case of a compilation, copyright in a collective work extends only to
those elements that are original with the claimant and does not affect the
protection given to the underlying contributions. 44 For instance, a copyright
in an anthology of poems in the public domain would not protect its owner
against others copying the underlying individual poems; rather, the
copyright would merely protect against copying or otherwise infringing the
anthology as a whole or the original elements of the anthology.45 These
elements would generally be limited to the publisher's selection,
46
coordination, or arrangement of the underlying work.
It is also important to note that, under the 1976 Act, the holder of a
copyright in a collective work is forbidden from altering the contributions
to that work. As this Note demonstrates, section 103(b) limits the copyright
ownership of a compilation to the original material contributed by the
publisher and makes clear that the contributor retains copyright in the
contribution. Because section 106(2) reserves the exclusive right to prepare
a derivative work for the copyright owner, the statute forbids publishers
40. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 35, § 3.04[B], at 3-20 (citing W.H. Anderson v.
Baldwin Law Publ'g Co., 27 F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1928)).
41. Feist Publications, Inc., 499 U.S. at 359-60 (citation omitted).
42. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
43. See JOYCE, supra note 32, § 4.01, at 253-54.
44. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1994).
45. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 35, § 3.04[A], at 3-19 n.6 (citing Silverman v.
CBS, Inc., 870 F.2d 40,49-50 (2d Cir. 1989)).
46. See id. § 3.04[B][2], at 3-24.
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from "recast[ing], transform[ing] or adapt[ing]" 47 underlying contributions
to their collective works.
Before the 1976 Act, there was much disagreement about the
relationship between copyright ownership in individual and collective
works.4' According to the doctrine of indivisibility, many perceived
copyright as incapable of being divided into smaller rights and could only
be secured if copyright "notice" appeared in the name of the copyright
owner.49 Thus, authors who granted rights to publish their articles were
often in grave risk of inadvertently losing their rights to publishers or
injecting their work into the public domain.50 The doctrine weakened in
Goodis v. United Artists Television, Inc. ,5' holding that a copyright in the
name of a periodical provides protection to an author where she has sold a
right of first publication, and Congress abolished this with the 1976 Act.
To this end, Congress intended for section 201(c) to elucidate the
"relationship between copyright ownership in a contribution and in the
collective work in which it appears. 52 The first sentence of this section
merely reiterates section 103(b): "Copyright in each separate contribution
to a collective work is distinct from copyright in the collective work as a
whole, and vests initially in the author of the contribution." With the
second sentence of section 201(c), along with the notice provision of
section 404, 3 Congress meant to preserve the author's copyright in an
underlying work "even if the contribution does not bear a separate notice in
the author's name, and without requiring any unqualified transfer of rights
to the owner of the collective work. '' s Under this section, if there is no
express transfer of the copyright or related rights, "the owner of copyright
in the collective work is presumed to have acquired only the privilege of
reproducing and distributing the contribution as part of that particular
collective work, any revision of that collective work, and any later
collective work in the same series. 55 The owner may not utilize the
47. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "derivative worl').
48. See JoYcE, supra note 32, § 4.01, at 268.
49. See LEAFFER, supra note 2, § 5.9, at 164.
50. See id. § 5.9, at 165.
51. 425 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1970).
52. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 122-23.
53. See 17 U.S.C. § 404(a) (1994) reads in part:
A separate contribution to a collective work may bear its own notice of copyright.
... However, a single notice applicable to the collective work as a whole is
sufficient to invoke the provisions ... as applicable with respect to the separate
contributions it contains .. .regardless of the ownership of copyright in the
contributions and whether or not they have been previously published.
54. JoYcE, supra note 32, at 254.
55. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1994).
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underlying work for any purposes falling outside of this statutory
description. Falling short of explicitly defining "revision," the House
Report provides several examples of permissible and impermissible
revisions:
Under the language of this clause, a publishing company could reprint
a contribution from one issue in a later issue of its magazine, and could
reprint an article from a 1980 edition of an encyclopedia in a 1990
revision of it; the publisher could not revise the contribution itself or
include it in a new anthology or an entirely different magazine or other
collective work.
5 6
How the courts should interpret the language of section 201(c) in
view of the House Report is at the heart of the present inquiry. As a prelude
to addressing this question directly, this Note considers the following
hypothetical scenario and how it relates to the 1976 Act.
C. A Hypothetical Case
Infringement Press (I-Press) publishes the hardcover 1998 Anthology
of Contemporary Poetry comprised of poems written and copyrighted by
living poets. Shortly following publication, I-Press arranges for the sale of
the individual copies of poems through Kwik-Copy which simultaneously
offers the full collection in a binder format. Moreover, across the heading
of each copy reads, "From the 1998 Anthology of Contemporary Poetry,
Infringement Press, 1998, page 101, also available from Kwik-Copy in full
form."
It is clear that I-Press, as owner of copyright in a collective work, is
authorized by section 201(c) to revise its anthology from a hardbound to a
binder version and market it through any legal means it sees fit. The mere
changing of a print format without altering content would fit squarely
within the statutory definition of revision. But presuming there are no
written assignments of copyrights in the poetry, dismantling the anthology
and selling the individual poems violates the poets' section 106(1)
exclusive right of reproduction. Under section 201(c), I-Press may only
reproduce and distribute the contribution as part of that particular
collective work, any revision of it, or a later collective work in the same
series. 57 The photocopies cannot individually be considered the particular
collective work, revisions of the anthology, or a later work in a series.58 To
the contrary, these photocopy reprints violate the poets' copyrights in their
56. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 122.
57. See id.
58. Ryan v. Carl Corp., 23 F. Supp.2d 1146, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 1998). "No reasonable
argument can be made that defendants in this case are 'revising' their collected works when
they photocopy individual articles." Id.
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contributions, making I-Press vulnerable to an infringement suit based on a
straightforward reading of the 1976 Act.
With this hypothetical as a backdrop, Parts III and IV focus on the
two leading cases which directly address the definition of revision under
section 201(c). Tasini v. New York Times originated as a 1997 district court
case and was reversed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in late 1999.
The case has attracted much attention because it addresses an issue of first
impression, and writers and publishers perceive that there is much at stake.
While not centrally addressing electronic media per se, Ryan v. Carl Corp.
offers an alternate view of the legislative history of the 1976 Act and may
predict a future split over section 201(c) interpretation akin to that seen
previously in other areas of copyright law.59
1I. TASINI V. NEw YORK TIMES: A CASE OF FIRST IMPRESSION
A. The Facts
In 1993, Jonathan Tasini and a group of five other freelance writers
filed suit against a group of publishers including The New York Times,
Newsday, and Sports Illustrated.60 The plaintiffs sold articles to the
defendant publishers, who provided the contents of their publications,
including these articles, to the remaining defendants: University Microfilms
International (UMI) and Mead. "The [p]ublishers' general practice was to
negotiate due-dates, word counts, subject matter and price; no express
transfer of rights under the [a]uthor's copyright was sought."
6 1
Mead entered into licensing agreements with each of the publishers,
whereby the publishers provided Mead with much of the content of their
periodicals, in digital form, for inclusion in NEXIS. Subscribers to NEXIS
were able to access any of the articles from one or more of the publishers
by using the database's search engine.62 Pursuant to an agreement with The
New York Times and Mead, UMI produced the "NY Times OnDisc"
59. See, e.g., Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1968);
Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988) (establishing two distinct
approaches to construing licensing contracts with respect to new media); see also Ricordi &
Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1951); Rohauer v. Killiam Shows,
Inc., 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1977) (representing two lines of cases interpreting derivative
authors' rights to exploit a work beyond the first term of the underlying work). The Supreme
Court ultimately rejected Rohauer's "new property rights" theory in holding that assignment
of renewal rights by an author does not defeat successors rights if the author dies before
renewal rights vest. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
60. See Tasini v. New York Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
61. Tasini v. New York Times Co., 192 F.3d 356, 358-59 (2d Cir. 1999) (footnote
omitted).
62. See id. at 359.
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(NYTO) CD-ROM, which contained the full texts of articles from The New
York Times. "It also produces ... a 'General Periodicals OnDisc' (GPO)
CD-ROM, which contains selected New York Times [sic] articles along
,61with thousands of other articles." UMI used a different method for the
GPO version of The New York Times Sunday book review and magazine
sections. For this purpose, UMI scanned these sections directly onto image-
based files which were also abstracted and included on the text-based
NYTO CD-ROM.
64
The asini plaintiffs claimed that by providing the articles to the
electronic databases, the defendant publishers infringed their individual
copyrights in the various articles they had licensed to the defendant
publishers.65 The defendants countered that section 201(c) of the Act
explicitly authorized "reproducing and distributing" the individual works in
"any revision of that collective work., 66 Because the district court could not
find any express transfer of electronic rights in the plaintiffs' articles, the
court saw the key issue as the precise scope and definition of "revision" in
section 201(c),67 or as the appellate court wrote: "whether one or more of
the pertinent electronic databases may be considered a 'revision' of the
individual periodical issues from which the articles were taken., 68 The
district court recognized that the issue was narrow, but also pointed out that
"its resolution [was] not simple: there [was] virtually no case law parsing
the terms of [s]ection 201(c), and certainly no precedent elucidating the
relationship between that provision and modem electronic technologies."
69
Thus, the district court set out to elucidate the terms of section 201(c) and
offer some clarification of the issues.
B. The Tasini District Court Analysis and Electronic Databases
In determining what constituted a revision, the Tasini I court focused
on what elements were retained, rather than discarded, in the electronic
republication. Specifically, the court derived a "recognizability" test from
the plain language of section 201(c) and the House Report writing: "The
question . . . [is] whether the electronic reproductions retain enough of




66. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 201(c)).
67. See Tasini v. New York Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 812 (S.D.N.Y 1997).
68. Tasini, 192 F.3d at 360.
69. Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 812.
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periodicals. ' 70 The court concluded that, even though NEXIS and CD-
ROMs lacked many visual elements and the page layout of the original
periodicals, they nevertheless retained the selection of articles making them
"recognizable" versions of those periodicals.7' Ultimately, the district court
offered the following test:
If the disputed periodicals manifest an original selection or
arrangement of materials, and if that originality is preserved
electronically, then the electronic reproductions can be deemed
permissible revisions of the publisher defendants' collective works. If,
on the other hand, the electronic defendants do not preserve the
originality of the disputed publications, but merely exploit the
component parts of those works, then plaintiffs' rights in those
component parts have been infringed.
Accepting for the moment the court's assumption that recognizability
closely relates to whether a publication is a revision, the next focus is on
the relevant technologies. NEXIS and CD-ROM formats exhibit different
characteristics, making it worthwhile to examine each separately with
respect to both database storage and access characteristics.
When utilizing the image-based GPO, one views a computerized
representation of the original print version of a publication. Contained
therein are various elements of the work, likely including a table of
contents and pictorial elements and the text of the articles of that issue. A
viewer commonly will access a periodical's individual issues as works in
their entirety and will be able to readily view the pictorial and textual
components together on the computer screen. Providing a collective work
through GPO can be seen as nothing more than changing the format of a
publication. A magazine is stored in its entirety on CD-ROM, and readers
are not easily able, nor encouraged, to reproduce individual articles.
Furthermore, "severability," 73 i.e., the user's ability to sever a work into its
component parts, is not usually a central feature of an image-based system.
In short, even though GPO uses advanced technology, there is no doubt
that the viewer will recognize each edition as a version of the original
publication and be able to access the issue in its entirety. Both the
70. Id. at 826.
71. See id.
72. Id. at 822.
73. By their nature, computerized versions of collective works are more severable than
traditional printed versions. With the ability to copy and paste text and images with the click
of a mouse, materials may be sliced and diced with unprecedented ease. But for the
purposes at hand, it is more important to focus on the technological forms of access rather
than the inherent qualities of material already accessed. Thus, this Note does not explore the
interesting but doubtful argument that a high degree of severability might be grounds for
contributory infringement.
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presentation and the method of technology utilized allows for this type of
CD-ROM publication to be recognizable under the Tasini I test and would
be considered a revision under section 201(c), as the court ultimately
concluded.
NEXIS and the text-based NYTO exhibit different storage and
retrieval attributes than GPO. NEXIS strips all elements except the text of a
publication's articles and retains no pictures, illustrations, or
advertisements, resulting in the absence of the organization and
coordination of the collective work's original elements. Users often do not
access articles "through data bases [sic] consisting only of those articles
printed in a particular identified periodical."'74 Indeed, users frequently
arrive at a particular article through a Boolean or a plain language search
referencing author, topic or text and not a publication at all . Perhaps most
important to the infringement question, NEXIS presents articles separately,
with the expectation that users will individually reprint them. This type of
database exhibits a high degree of severability and offers, as a central
feature of its service, the ability to use individual articles in a variety of
ways.
The court in Tasini I wrote that "immersion into a larger data base
[sic] does not automatically mean .. . that the defendant publisher's
protected original selection is lost.' 7 The court held that the conversion of
articles to NEXIS and CD-ROM formats is permissible because the
publishers' selection of the articles remained, even if formatting and certain
elements of the original work were absent when immersed in larger
databases.77 The court explained that "once an article is selected for review,
that article is identified not only by author, but by the publication, issue,
and page number in which it appeared.... They tag those articles in such a
way that the publisher defendants' original selection remains evident
online. 78 Since tagging will allow a reader to recognize an article's origin,
the court reasoned, it must be legally adequate to support a valid revision.
74. Id. at 824.
75. See LEARNING NEXIS: A HANDBOOK FOR LEXIS-NEXIS RESEARCH ON THE
INTERNET (1998).
76. Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 824.
77. The district court in Tasini stated that, "aside from the image-based CD-ROM, the
disputed technologies do not reproduce the photographs, captions, and page lay-out of the
defendant publications .... Ultimately, however, these changes to the defendant publishers'
hard copy periodicals are of only peripheral concern to the 'revision' analysis." Id.
78. Id. (footnote omitted).
79. According to the recognizability test, there would be no requirement for individual
contributions in collective work revisions to be presented together at all, only that the
contributions independently reference the collective work in which they appeared and that
they be immediately available in a proper collective form at the same location. In this world
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To add support to its tagging concept, the Tasini I court reasoned that
the value of the articles was enhanced by attaching a magazine or
newspaper label to them. It wrote:
Once in a data base [sic) ... an article's association with a particular
periodical plainly enhances the value of that article. Indeed, an article
appearing in Newsday or The New York Times is instantly imbued with
a certain degree of credibility that might not exist in the case of an
article never published.
so
While perhaps true, "added value" is not a defense against
infringement, nor does it analytically relate to copyright law at all. For
instance, in the absence of a legal assignment of rights, The New York
Times may not legally create and publish a novel based on a freelance story
it has published.8s The publisher may be very successful in such an
adaptation, and its imprimatur could certainly enhance the value of the
story. Nevertheless, such a publication constitutes a naked violation of
section 106(2) of the 1976 Act providing a copyright owner with the
exclusive right to prepare a derivative work. In the final analysis, any
theory of "added value" should play no part in the court's analysis of
whether or not electronic revisions are authorized. Furthermore, tagging
should not save an otherwise unrecognizable collective work from being
deemed an infringement.
The district court in Tasini would have been more consistent with the
purpose of the 1976 Act if it had stated the following test: In order to
qualify as a revision, a reproduction must be recognizable without tagging.
For NEXIS or other text-based formats to pass such a test, they would be
forced to present a collective work as a whole, not merely the dismantled
parts of the whole. Nothing would require a revision to include each and
every component part of the collective work-only enough for a reader to
recognize it as a revision of the original collective work. While this
alternative test might not be foolproof, it certainly would go a long way
toward assuring that publishers were not merely passing off individual
works as revisions in order to profit from their unauthorized use.
C. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals Reverses
On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected outright the Tasini publishers'
argument that each database constitutes a revision of the particular
collective work in which each author's individual contribution first
of tagging, even the hypothetical unauthorized republication, discussed in Part I, presumably
would be legal.
80. Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 824 n.12.
81. See Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 633-34 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that the publisher
of a magazine did not have exclusive right to adapt an article into book form).
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appeared . 2 The appellate decision was a succinct reversal-far shorter than
the district court's opinion with which it disagreed.
The court first examined the plain language of section 201(c),
following the ordinary principles of statutory construction, which state that
"the meaning of one term may be determined by reference to the terms it is
associated with."83 The court concluded that the second clause of section
201(c) must be read in the context of the first and third clauses:
The first clause sets the floor, so to speak, of the privilege. The
collective-work author is permitted to reproduce and distribute
individual contributions as part of "that particular collective work." In
this context, "that particular collective work" means a specific edition
or issue of a periodical. The second clause expands the privilege, to
permit the reproduction and distribution of the individual contribution
as part of a "revision" of "that collective work," i.e., a revision of a
particular edition of a specific periodical. Finally, the third clause sets
the outer limit or ceiling on the privilege. It permits the reproduction
and distribution of the individual contribution as part of a "later
collective work in the same series," such as a new edition of a
dictionary or encyclopedia.8
Within this context, the court stated that the most "natural reading of
the 'revision' ... privilege protects only later editions of a particular issue
of a periodical, such as a final edition of a newspaper."85 Later editions
might not be protected without the second clause because they are not
identical to original editions.
The Tasini I court reasoned that the publishers' view of electronic
databases as revisions could not be squared with basic cannons of statutory
construction for two reasons. First, if the contents of databases were merely
revisions, the third clause of section 201(c)--"permitting the reproduction
and distribution of an individually copyrighted work as part of 'a later
collective work in the same series'-would be superfluous."" If the court
viewed the databases as revisions, there would be no need for a privilege
for a later collective work in the same series.8 7 Second, the section 201(c)
privilege is an "exception to the general rule that copyright vests initially in
82. See Tasini v. New York Times Co., 192 F.3d 356, 362 (2d Cir. 1999).
83. Id. at 361 (citing General Elec. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 583 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1978).
84. Id. at 361-62 (citation omitted).
85. Id. at 362.
86. Id. (citing Regions Hosp. v. Shalala, 522 U.S. 448 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("It
is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that significance and effect shall, if possible, be
accorded to every word. As early as in Bacon's Abridgment, [section] 2, it was said that 'a
statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause,
sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant."').
87. See id.
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the author of the individual contribution," and reading "revision!' as
broadly as publishers suggest "would cause the exception to swallow the
rule. , ,
The court of appeals, directly addressing the publishers' contention
that the databases were revisions because all of the articles from their
publications could be retrieved individually, made the exact point
illustrated by the hypothetical in Part II.C of this Note. "Section 201(c)
would not permit a [p]ublisher to sell a hard copy of an [a]uthor's article to
the public even if the [p]ublisher also offered for individual sale all of the
other articles from the particular edition;" and "nothing in [section 201(c)]
would allow [p]ublishers to achieve the same goal indirectly through
NEXIS.
89
Furthermore, the court of appeals saw the publishers' reading of
section 201(c) to be "in considerable tension with the overall statutory
framework." As discussed in Part II, section 201(d) of the 1976 Act
expressly permitted the transfer of less than the entire copyright, replacing
the notion of "indivisibility" with that of "exclusive rights" under a
copyright. The court reasoned that, "[w]ere the privileges as broad and as
transferable as [the publishers] contend[ed], it is not clear that the rights
retained by the [a]uthors could be considered 'exclusive' in any meaningful
sense." 
91
From its statutory analysis, the Tasini II court shifted to a brief
discussion of the technological aspects of the databases. Where the district
court had focused on what the databases retained of the original work, the
court of appeals concluded that "NEXIS does almost nothing to preserve
the copyrightable aspects of the [p]ublishers' collective works."92 In
placing an edition of The New York Times on NEXIS, the court noted that
some of the paper's content and most of its arrangement were lost. The end
user can only access the "preexisting materials that belong to the individual
authors under [s]ections 201(c) and 103(b)" of the 1976 Act.93 The court
refrained from any comment on the lower courts lengthy discussion of
tagging and identification of the collective work publications on NEXIS.
The Tasini II court acknowledged that "the UMI databases presented
a slightly more difficult issue than did NEXIS."'94 First, "NYTO was seen to
88. Ma (citation omitted).
89. Id. at 362-63.
90. Id. at 363.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 364.
94. Id.
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be distinguishable from NEXIS in that it contained articles from only one
publisher." 95 But this factor was not seen to affect the underlying authors'
rights in any way. Thus, the court viewed NYTO as similar to NEXIS, the
same legal analysis applied, and NYTO was not a valid revision under
section 201(c). Second, although GPO contained scanned images "of
editions of The New York Times Sunday book review and magazine, it also
contained articles from numerous other periodicals." 96 The court of appeals
concluded that GPO was also "substantially similar to NEXIS, and it [was]
at best a new anthology," not authorized by section 201(c).
97
The Tasini II court emphasized the narrow issue being decided:
Whether, in the absence of a transfer of copyright or any rights thereunder,
collective-work authors may relicense individual works in which they own
no rights." Because there was no express transfer of rights in such cases by
definition, the Tasini II decision entirely turned on the default allocation of
rights provided by the 1976 Act. Holding that section 201(c) did not
provide collective-work authors with the privilege of licensing individual
works to electronic databases, the court also made clear that publishers and
authors were free to contract around the statutory framework.99
D. The Role of Public Policy in the Tasini Decisions
Near the outset of its opinion, the district court in Tasini noted that the
House Report clarified that the 1976 Act "in significant part, amounts to a
repudiation of the concept of copyright indivisibility. ' ° The court argued
that in putting the final dagger in the doctrine, Congress was not
constraining publishers in their efforts to create and sell their permitted
revisions and reproductions.'1 Such an approach, it explained, would only
serve to "undermine the competing goal of ensuring that collective works
be marketed and distributed to the public."' 2 The section of the House
Report on which the court relied in formulating its argument reads as
follows:
The basic presumption of section 201(c) is fully consistent with
present law and practice, and represents a fair balancing of equities. At
the same time, the last clause of the subsection, under which the






100. Tasini v. New York Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
101. See id.
102. Id. at 815-16.
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circumstances would be presumed, is an essential counterpart of the
basic presumption.
While the district court accurately interpreted the words "basic
presumption" to favor authors, it inaccurately portrayed the phrase
"essential counterpart" as favoring a policy goal of wide distribution of
collective works. Neither the legislative history nor the statutory text
provide any evidence that section 201(c) supports such a policy. Congress
more likely employed the phrase "essential counterpart" to refer to a
property interest held by the author of a collective work.'04 The House
Report, in referring to a "balancing of equities," speaks of a balance
between author and publisher, not between author and society. While the
larger goals of copyright law may seek to benefit the public by encouraging
the creation and dissemination of original works, 0 these would not be
determinative in delineating ownership rights with respect to a collective
work. Consequently, the legislative history of the 1976 Act should be read
to interpret section 201(c) as clarifying authors' and publishers' rights and
not creating any new policies concerning copyright law and practice.
This is the view of the court in the 1998 Ryan case which Part IV
addresses.
IV. RYAN V. CARL CORPORATION: AN ALTERNATE VIEW FROM
THE NINTH CIRCurr
A. The Facts
Ryan v. Carl Corp.,'0" a copyright infringement suit, involves four
freelance writers who authorized the publication of their book excerpts in
magazines.03 These plaintiffs sued the UnCover company which
maintained an Internet database that contains titles, but not the text, of
approximately eight million articles from about seventeen thousand
periodicals. When a customer or library requested an article, an UnCover
representative went to a library that carries the periodical, copied the
article, and sent it to the customer with a bill. UnCover then sent a
copyright payment to the publisher of the periodical. If the publisher
explicitly granted permission or deposited the check without response,
UnCover continued to copy articles by that publisher upon request. If the
103. H.R. REPORT NO. 94-1476, at 122.
104. See Ryan v. Carl Corp., 23 F. Supp.2d 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
105. See supra Part II.A.
106. See Ryan, 23 F. Supp.2d at 1149.
107. 23 F. Supp.2d 1146.
108. See id. at 1147.
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publisher refused permission, UnCover "blocked" articles by that publisher
in the future. UnCover never contacted or sent payments to individual
authors of the articles.
B. The Ryan Analysis
Ryan is significant because it is the sole decision other than the Tasini
decisions addressing the legislative history of section 201(c). The Ryan
court rejected Tasini Is interpretation of the legislative history of section
201(c) and strengthened authors' section 106 rights in the context of
collective work licenses. First, in addressing the legislative history of the
1976 Act, the Ryan court wrote: To reach "a predictable and equitable
distribution of rights between author and publisher.... Both the language
and the legislative history of section 201(c) suggest that when in doubt,
courts should construe the rights of publishers narrowly rather than broadly
in relation to those of authors.'09 Congress enacted section 201(c) "in
response to the doctrine of copyright indivisibility.... When determining
the respective rights of publishers and authors under section 201(c), one
must bear in mind that Congress passed the section to enlarge the rights of
authors."" 0
Ryan, like Tasini I, recognized that Congress enacted section 201(c)
in response to the doctrine of copyright indivisibility and agreed that the
House Report confirms such a conclusion."' However, the Ryan court
interpreted the legislative history in a more favorable light to authors and
licensors. The defendants in Ryan raised the issue of distribution of
information allowing the court to address the societal efficiency argument
directly, albeit in dicta:
From the standpoint of societal efficiency, it makes more sense to
allocate the right of reproduction to publishers, because publishers are
easier to locate.... The Court, however, is not free to construe statutes
in the manner most efficient. Instead, it must follow the intent of
Congress as expressed in the terms of the statute.112
The Ryan court made clear that economic policies should be
subordinated to statutory analyses when deciding an issue of copyright
ownership in collective works. This judicial viewpoint makes Ryan an
important first step in interpreting section 201(c) in the Ninth Circuit.
The second and perhaps most important aspect of Ryan lies in its view
of section 201(c) as reinforcing authors' rights of reproduction when
109. Id. at 1149-50.
110. Id. at 1150.
111. See id.
112. Id. at 1150-51.
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licensing works to publishers. The Ryan court, quoting section 201(c),
pointed out that unless parties contract otherwise, "the owner of copyright
in the collective work is presumed to have acquired only the privilege of
reproducing and distributing the contribution as part of that... work."
113
The court argued that the case turned on the meaning of the words "as part"
and that, because defendants photocopied only individual articles, this
could not be viewed as part of the collective work.1 4 Therefore, publishers
could not legally authorize UnCover to reprint articles in which it did not
own the copyright any more than I-Press could authorize Kwik-Copy in
this Note's earlier hypothetical."-
C. Can There Be Infringement Regardless of the Revision Issue?
The Ryan court's conclusion that "the right of reproduction must
belong to the authors"11 6 naturally flows from the 1976 Act and can be seen
as separate from the notion of whether a collective work is deemed a
revision. For example, Newsweek may publish the excerpts from Stephen
King's new novel and may legally republish those excerpts in a large-print
edition of the magazine. Newsweek may not, however, sell or authorize the
sale of reprints of the large print excerpts alone. Hence the Ryan court's
statement that "[c]alling the reproduction of a single article a 'revision' of a





Now consider electronic media with respect to the same problem.
Even if republication of freelance articles on NEXIS were considered a
revision (which this Note clearly argues that it should not be), New York
Times or NEXIS would not have a legal right to authorize or facilitate the
reproduction of these single articles. This conclusion is consistent with
Ryan and what seems to be the correct reading of the 1976 Act. Yet, the
essence of NEXIS is the ability of students and professionals to reprint
individual articles with ease. Finally, Part V addresses the new media cases
of the past several decades which will further the discussion with regard to
the role of policy in copyright law.
113. Id. at 1149.
114. See id.
115. See supra Part II.C.
116. Ryan, 23 F. Supp.2d at 1150.
117. Id.
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V. THE ROLE OF COPYRIGHT POLICY IN INTERPRETING
LICENSES IN LIGHT OF NEW MEDIA
As previously discussed, this Note primarily addresses freelance
agreements solely authorizing the first publication rights of articles in
collective works."" One might consider, as the Tasini I court did," 9 that
case law parsing broader licensing agreements is irrelevant to the issue at
hand. The opinions, nevertheless, offer valuable insight into judicial
motivation in the area of copyright and new media, especially in
circumstances where no clear resolution is obvious to a court.
Judges and scholars are not in complete accord on the capacity of
broad licenses to cover future markets resulting from new technologies.'o
Over the past several decades, two distinct approaches have developed,
including the narrow Ninth Circuit rule stating that any rights not expressly
and unambiguously granted in a license are reserved to the licensor,1 and
the broad Second Circuit rationale allowing the licensee to "properly
pursue any uses that may reasonably be said to fall within the medium as
described in the license."'
22
The former approach is rooted in Cohen v. Paramount Pictures,
Corp.,123 which dealt with the issue of whether a license to use a musical
composition in a film to be exhibited in theaters and on television included
the right to use the composition in videocassette reproductions not
envisaged at the time of the contract.124 The court held the licensee's rights
do not extend to distribution by videocassette based on a lack of language
broad enough to encompass this type of future technology. In support of its
opinion, the Cohen court wrote, "the purpose underlying federal copyright
law ... [is] 'to afford greater encouragement to the production of literary
works of lasting benefit to the world. '""2' The Cohen court concluded that it
would frustrate the purposes of the Act to construe the license to grant a
118. See supra note 4.
119. See Tasini v. New York Times Co. 972 F. Supp. 804, 812 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
("Time's reliance upon the Bartsch line of authority is misplaced.... None of these cases,
however, involved a contract (like the one before the Court) that imposed specific temporal
limitations such as first 'publication rights."').
120. See Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481,
486 (2d Cir. 1998).
121. See, e.g., Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988)
122. NiMMER & NimMER supra note 35, § 10.10[b], at 10-91.
123. 845F.2d851.
124. See id. at 852.
125. Id. at 854 (citing Washington Publ'g Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939); Scott
v. WKJG, Inc., 376 F.2d 467, 469 (7th Cir. 1967) ("a copyright is intended to protect
authorship"); Jondora Music Publ'g Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 506 F.2d 392, 395 (3d
Cir. 1975) ("The copyright law is enacted for the benefit of the composer")).
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right in a medium unknown at the time of the original agreement." 6 One
inference to be drawn from Cohen is that, in construing agreements dealing
with new media, close questions should be decided in favor of licensors to
ensure that authors receive adequate incentives to create. 27
The competing Second Circuit approach is rooted in Bartsch v.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.,' 2s which involved an assignment of a musical
play in which the assignee was given the right to "project, transmit[,] and
otherwise reproduce . . . by the art of cinematography or any process
analogous thereto." 129 Although denying the licensee the right to broadcast
the work via live telecast, the court held that the license did include motion
picture rights and, most importantly, placed the burden on the licensor to
show that the terms of the license did not extend to the new medium. 30 The
Bartsch court wrote, "if Bartsch or his assignors had desired to limit
'exhibition' of the motion picture to the conventional method where light is
carried from a projector to a screen directly beheld by the viewer, they
could have said so.' 3' In further justification of its decision, the court
concluded that a narrower definition might impede distribution of works in
the new media by creating a deadlock between grantor and grantee. 32 But
unlike in Cohen, the Bartsch court offered no judicial or statutory support
for its motivating policy of better distribution. As the Ryan opinion
discussed, from the standpoint of efficiency, it often makes more sense to
allocate rights to licensees. But the courts are not free to construe laws in
the manner most efficient; rather, they must interpret the law based on
statutes and case law and turn to legislative history to clarify congressional
intent when necessary.' 4
In the recent decision Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v.
Walt Disney Co.,135 the Second Circuit attempted to clarify the Bartsch
126. See Cohen, 845 F.2d at 854.
127. See LEAFFER, supra note 2, § 4.11, at 167, § 5.10. Leaffer further argues that it is
ilogical to assume that unknown uses could provide incentive effects since they could not
possibly be in the mind of an author at the time of creation. But he fails to take into account
the possibility that, while authors may not be able to foresee specific new technologies, they
may have increased motivation to create if they feel secure in "all possible future rights." As
technology accelerates, it would be wise to examine this phenomenon further.
128. 391 F.2d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 1968).
129. Id.
130. See id. at 155.
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. See Ryan v. Carl Corp., 23 F. Supp.2d 1146, 1151 (N.D. Cal. 1998); see also supra
Part IV.
134. See Ryan, 23 F. Supp.2d at 1151.
135. 145 F.3d 481, 486 (2d Cir. 1998).
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ruling. Holding that a 1939 license to use the composition "Rite of Spring"
in the film "Fantasia" included video rights, the court endorsed a strict
construction approach to dealing with new media cases. It argued that "[i]f
the contract is more reasonably read to convey one meaning, the party
benefited by that reading should be able to rely on it; the party seeking
exception... should bear the burden .... ,136 The Boosey decision made
clear that there should not be a default rule favoring licensors or licensees.
Rather, courts should simply follow the words of the contract to determine
which party is entitled to new media rights. 137 The Boosey court did not
indicate that it had an underlying policy motivation other than fairness in
construing contracts.
Whether Boosey will help to reconcile the Cohen and Bartsch lines of
decisions remains to be seen. To a certain degree, it seems to state the
obvious: A contract means what it says it means. What one party views as
unambiguously granting another may see as reasonably falling within the
medium described. This subjective view of the problem offers no
landmarks or policies to assist in close cases of contracts involving new
media issues. In another sense, Boosey does strive to level the playing field.
Where Cohen can be viewed as favoring licensors and Bartsch has been
construed as a default rule for licensees, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in Boosey has declared that there will be no favored party with
regard to new media licensing cases. Instead, the language of the contract
will rule. This, of course, offers little help in the case of ambiguous
language.
Professor William Patry, in his treatise Copyright Law and Practice,
provides further statutory rationale for deciding in favor of licensors in
cases in which the language of an agreement is not clear:
While not all agreements can be neatly construed "broadly" or
"strictly," agreements should, wherever possible, be construed in favor
of the copyright transferor, on the ground that the principle embodied
in [s]ection 204(a)-a transfer of rights is valid if it is in writing and
signed by the owner of the rights conveyed-reflects a policy judgment
that copyright owners should retain all rights unless specifically
transferred.
Thus, section 204(a) adds support to the notion that the 1976 Act
favors the authors of creative works over licensees of those works in the
absence of express transfers.
At this point, it is helpful to emphasize how the new media cases
relate to the section 201(c) inquiry. Where the new media cases concerned
136. Id. at 487.
137. See id.
138. WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 392 (1994).
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contractual interpretation, Tasini and Ryan involved statutory
interpretation. Yet, in light of the ambiguous circumstances existing in the
facts of both sets of cases, the courts turned to policy rationales to inform
their decisions. It is clear that the Cohen court's emphasis on copyright's
incentive policy was consistent with the Ryan court's view of section
201(c) interpretation. Both cases hailed from the Ninth Circuit and
suggested that the 1976 Act enlarges the rights of authors and consequently
that, when in doubt, courts should decide in the favor of authors. In
contrast, Bartsch and Tasini I, were motivated to a large degree by an
underlying policy goal of efficient distribution. Consistently, both favored
the licensee in their respective holdings. The Tasini II court did not discuss
policy rationales, but its decision strengthened authors' ownership rights
consistent with the incentive policy. While the incentive policy is grounded
in copyright law and, indeed the Constitution,'39 neither Congress nor the
Constitution has addressed the policy of distributional efficiency.
Therefore, the former should be seen as a valid driving force behind
decision making by the courts in copyright cases, while the latter should
not play a determinative role.
VI. THE SOLUTION: COPYRIGHT CLEARINGHOUSES
The publishing industry has prophesied "dire consequences" if it must
find and obtain permission from every freelance author for its unauthorized
electronic revision of the author's articles."'4 But to comply with the
Copyright Act, publishers only need to register with the fledgling
Publication Rights Clearinghouse (PRC), a collective-licensing system in
which writers contract with the PRC to act as their agent in licensing
secondary rights to their previously published articles. 141 These articles then
become part of the PRC inventory to be administered for the length of the
contract. Because the PRC is loosely modeled after the well-established
performing rights collection system used in the music industry, 42 a brief
survey of music licensing will shed light on how author's may effectively
be compensated for their creative enterprises.
Each public performance of a musical work--on the radio or
television, in a live performance, or in a store or restaurant-is a possible
source of revenue for the copyright holder (usually the composer or a
139. See supra Part II.
140. Plaintiffs Appeal Reply Brief, Tasini v. New York Times Co., (2d Cir.) (No. 97-
9181), available at (last modified July 29, 1999) <http://www.nwu.org/tvt/tvtrep98.htm>.
141. See National Writers Union, About the Publications Rights Clearinghouse (last
modified July 29, 1999) <http:llwww.nwu.orglprc/prcabout.htm>.
142. See id.
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music publisher). The performing rights societies, including the American
Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP), Broadcast
Music, Inc. (BMI), and SESAC (originally known as the Society of
European Stage, Authors, and Composers), provide the means by which
composers and other holders of copyrights in musical works police, license,
and administer their performance rights within the United States.143 These
organizations collect and distribute performance royalties quarterly and
police unauthorized performances.' 44
The mechanics of ASCAP further explain how a performance rights
organization functions. An ASCAP licensor agreement is comprised of
three important terms.'45 First, the licensor members grant the organization
the nonexclusive right to license nondramatic public performances of their
works. Second, the members grant ASCAP the right to bring suit in their
names to enforce the performance rights in these works. Third, the
members agree to ASCAP's method of royalty distribution. Royalties for
radio, television, and background music performances flow from "blanket
licenses," which authorize the public performance of all the millions of
compositions in the entire ASCAP repertoire by radio and television
stations; commercial retail, restaurant, and entertainment establishments;
and music services such as Muzak. 146 The fee can range from a few hundred
dollars per year for small businesses to millions of dollars per year for large
broadcast entities.' 47 Thus, ASCAP does not require of licensees the
burdensome (and perhaps impossible) task of licensing individual
performances. Rather, it merely mandates that entities acquire a blanket
license if they wish to publicly perform any ASCAP members' works.
ASCAP collects hundreds of millions of dollars in licensing fees each148
year. After the monies are used to pay the nonprofit organization's
operating expenses, the remainder is divided amongst members based on
radio and television airplay. 49 ASCAP utilizes sampling and statistical
techniques, as well as performance data provided by broadcasters to
143. See LEAFFER, supra note 2, § 8.22(A), at 347. (The performing rights societies are
recognized in § 116(e) of the 1976 Act).
144. See Mark Halloran, Performing Rights Organizations: An Overview, in THE
MusIcIAN's BusINEss & LEGAL GUIDE 106, 108 (Mark Halloran ed., 1996).
145. See LEAFFER, supra note 2, § 8.22(B), at 348.
146. See DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL You NEED TO KNOW ABouT THE Music BusINEss
231-34 (1997).
147. See id. at 232.
148. See Halloran, supra note 144, at 108. (In 1994, ASCAP collected approximately
$423,000,000 in royalties and distributed nearly $230,000,000 to its members).
149. See PASSMAN, supra note 146, at 232.
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determine the proportionality of payments to its members.1 50 BMI and
SESAC, while differing from ASCAP in structure and function, essentially
provide the same services for their members and stand as further evidence
that copyright holders do receive compensation for the use of their works in
the field of music.
In addition to the performing rights organizations, the Copyright
Clearance Center (CCC) provides yet another example of how third-party
organizations can provide administration of exclusive rights outside of the
electronic revision context. Massive unauthorized reproduction of
copyrighted material often occurs at corporate and other libraries and
commercial copy stores every year, and policing the reproduction right is
practically impossible for individual copyright owners. But authors may
contract with CCC or other copyright clearinghouses who monitor,
manage, and distribute the income derived from copying of its members'
works.1 2 The CCC recovers fees in two ways. First, the Transactional
Reporting System is a self-reporting system whereby users forward fees,
often listed on the first page of a publication. Second, the Annual
Authorization Service uses statistical samples from users' photocopy
machines to estimate fees owed to authors.153 In order to reduce monitoring
costs, the CCC has further developed statistical methods within many
industries based upon the average amount of copying in that industry and
prices charged by publishers.' 54 This method of collection most closely
mirrors the blanket license used by performing rights organizations in the
field of music.
The ASCAP and CCC models provide evidence that tracking of
electronic revisions will not be overly burdensome, and certainly not
impossible, for publishers. If Tasini H remains good law, and if its
proauthor holding is extended to other jurisdictions, most authors will
undoubtedly affiliate with the PRC or a similar organization.'55 As the PRC
continues to collect revenues derived from its licensed works, member
authors who have retained copyright in their articles and other literary
150. See id.
151. See LEAFFER, supra note 2, § 10.12(C), at 449.
152. See Plaintiffs Appeal Reply Brief, Tasini v. New York Times Co., (2d Cir.) (No.
97-9181), available at (last modified July 29, 1999) <http://www.nwu.org/
tvt/tvtrep98.htm>.
153. See LEAFFER, supra note 2, § 10.12(C), at 449.
154. See id.
155. Through its partnership with UnCover and the CCC, the PRC has already paid
thousands of dollars in royalties to authors including Isabel Allende, Barbara Kingsolver
and Erica Jong. See National Writers Union, supra note 141.
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works will increasingly receive royalties for electronic revisions on a
periodic basis. 151
VII. CONCLUSION
Whether a collective work owner's right of revision should include
reproduction in a specific electronic medium should depend on two factors.
First, a collective work owner's original contribution must be retained in
the new format; and second, the revision must be recognizable as a version
of the original collective work without tagging. In close cases, the courts
should construe their decisions in favor of the author based on the rationale
in Ryan and Cohen, and consistent with Tasini H and the history and
policies of copyright.
With this test, a CD-ROM version of a publication may very well be
an authorized revision if published substantially similarly to the original
version. Changing the format alone should not be determinative.
Publication on NEXIS should not be considered an authorized section
201(c) revision because its isolated presentation prevents recognizability
and further encourages unauthorized reproduction of individually
copyrighted works.
Future courts dealing with section 201(c) issues must be careful not to
fall into the traps inherent in applying old laws to new technologies. The
court should not allow in the virtual world, of NEXIS or any other new
technology, what it would not allow in the real world of paper, printing
presses, and photocopy machines. As long as Congress intends to prevent
the unauthorized reproduction of individual contributions to collective
works, the courts should equally guard against such reproductions-
whether computerized or not.
Toward the end of its opinion, the Tasini I court wrote, "[i]f Congress
agrees with plaintiffs that, in today's world of pricey electronic information
systems, [s]ection 201(c) no longer serves its intended purposes, Congress
is of course free to revise that provision to achieve a more equitable
result." 157 In light of the above analysis and consistent with the Tasini II
decision, this statement would more accurately read: If Congress believes
that the Copyright Act does not serve societal efficiency, Congress is free
to revise the law to achieve a more efficient result.
156. See, e.g., National Writers Union, The Publication Rights Clearinghouse: The
National Writers Union Solution (last modified Sept. 26, 1999)
<http://www.nwu.org/tvt/tvtprc.htm>.
157. Tasini v. New York Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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